Never Questioned, Chilcot

      This summer saw the long overdue publishing on the Chilcot Report following the investigations into the Iraq war 2003. I have not read the Chilcot report. I am not going to defend or attack anyone here including Blair, Bush or any others named in the media. I am also not going to enter into debate as to whether the war was legal or not. I am however going to cover a couple of points that I have heard/ read during the week which I feel all decision makers should take a moment to think about as I think the handling of the Iraq invasion and aftermath provide an extreme example of a number of familiar circumstances coming together to create a particular outcome.

Follow the leader,
anybody in any position over others assumes an amount of responsibility and trust, they speak with an authority. very often this is deserved through expertise or experience, sometimes this comes from others opinion as to how an individual behaves and reacts to information and challenges.
Any leader can be great when things appeal to them or capture their interest, any leader can be weak when their interest in a particular matter is distracted, clouded or over welmed. It is at this point that in national government select committees and in local government scrutiny committees should play a vital role in ensuring nothing falls through the gap. These committees are made up of elected individuals who have been elected to represent the best interests of their electorate. We are getting so used to picking out an individual and blaming them, often the buck stops with them, but all MP's at the time had a responsibility to ensure the reasons to go to war in Iraq were questioned and checked as they should with all policy changes. Local Government councillors have the same responsibility and must ensure the resource, structures and cultures are in place to fore fill this role.


some extracts of the press



"flawed" intelligence with inadequate preparation at a time when Saddam Hussein did not pose an "imminent threat".


While the Chilcot Report contained "serious criticisms", it showed that "there were no lies, Parliament and the Cabinet were not misled, there was no secret commitment to war, intelligence was not falsified and the decision was made in good faith", it said.

The inquiry found that right up to the eve of the invasion Sir John was continuing to advise the Prime Minister that Iraq had the CBW with the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce more.

The report strongly criticised the failure to reassess the JIC assessment that Saddam had managed to retain a covert CBW capability after the 1991 Gulf War, even after the UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix was unable to find them.

"At no stage was the hypothesis that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or the policy community," it said.